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A CRITIQUE OF CONTEMPORARY 
EGALITARIANISM: A CHRISTIAN PERSPECTIVE 
Louis P. Pojman 
In this paper I examine several arguments used to base equal rights on equal 
human worth. After a brief overview of the history of the doctrine of natural 
rights in Part I, I examine Kant's egalitarian theory of the kingdom of ends 
in Part II. In Part III I examine contemporary secular arguments for the equal 
rights doctrine and conclude that none of them succeeds. Finally, in Part IV, 
I argue that the idea of equal human rights has its natural home in a Christian 
world view where God is the Source of all value whence derives equal human 
worth and equal human rights. 
We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that 
they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights, that among 
these are life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness. 
(The Declaration of Independence of the United States of America) 
All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are 
endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in 
a spirit of brotherhood. 
(United Nations' Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948) 
Rights theories are alive and well in contemporary social-political philoso-
phy. In the last two decades an exponential growth of books and articles has 
occurred, in which proponents have set forth arguments and theories for equal 
human rights.l Occasionally, we find a skeptic in the midst who either rejects 
the notion of human rights or takes a relativist view of the matter.2 Perhaps 
the most notorious of these skeptics is Arthur Danto who views human rights 
as claims that our peers will let us get away with. 
In the afterwash of [the student revolt of] 1968, I found myself a member of 
a group charged with working out disciplinary procedures for acts against 
my university. It was an exemplary group from the perspective of represen-
tation so urgent at the time: administrators, tenured and non-tenured faculty, 
graduate and undergraduate students, men and women, whites and blacks. 
We all wondered, nevertheless, what right we had to do what was asked of 
us, and a good bit of time went into expressing our insecurities. Finally, a 
man from the law-school said, with the tried patience of someone required 
to explain what should be plain as day in a tone of voice I can still hear: 
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"This is the way it is with rights. You want 'em, so you say you got 'em, and 
if nobody says you don't then you do." In the end he was right. We worked 
a code out which nobody liked, but in debating it the community acknowl-
edged the rights. 3 
Danto is in the minority. Most moral and political philosophers think that a 
human being possesses rights because of the very fact that he or she is a 
person, of equal dignity, and who consequently is not merely a means to an 
end, but an end, an end which must be treated as such. The phrase 'dignity 
of the human person' signifies in the words of Jacques Maritan, that "the 
human person has the right to be respected, is the subject of rights, possesses 
rights. These are things which are owed to [a person] because of the very fact 
that he is a [person]."4 The notion of equal human rights based on equal 
human worth has become, in the words of Ronald Dworkin, one of "the 
deepest moral assumptions" of our time. 
In this paper I would like to examine some of the arguments used to base 
equal rights on equal human worth and point out their problems. After a brief 
overview of the history of the doctrine of human or natural rights in Part I, 
I will in Part II examine Kant's theory of the equal and absolute worth of all 
rational beings. Then in Part III I will examine several secular arguments 
which base human rights on the assumption of equal human worth. In Part 
IV I will suggest that the idea of equal human rights has its home in a theistic, 
Christian world view where God is the Source of all value and humans derive 
their equal worth by being created by him and in his image. 
I. A Brief Historical Overview on the Notion of Human Rights 
Let me outline some of the major views on human rights up to Kant. The 
classical Greek moral philosophers (The Sophists, Socrates, Plato and Aristotle) 
do not speak of equal rights, and the notion that humans are of equal worth 
would make no sense to them. For Plato and Aristotle, human beings, like 
everything else, have a function and some fulfill this function better than 
others. Value is determined by a person's capacity to fulfill this function, and 
hence, some are better than others.5 Greek secular ethics are essentially hi-
erarchical and meritocratic. According to Plato, everyone should have an 
equal opportunity (males and females), but early on a caste separation based 
on ability must take place. The golden souled children should be separated 
from those with silver, iron or bronze souls and treated appropriately. De-
mocracy was rejected as an unjust distribution, treating unequals as though 
they were equals. 6 
Aristotle, who made reason the criterion of worth, believed that most peo-
ple were worthless (fit to be slaves), a minority were good (noble) and a few 
were excellent (had arete). Only the latter two categories were of any impor-
tance. "It is manifest," he wrote, "that there are classes of people of whom 
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some are freemen and others slaves by nature, and for these slavery is an 
institution both expedient and juSt."7 Although all humans had the same 
distinguishing form (viz. rationality), they had different degrees of recalci-
trant matter in their beings which limited the actualization of rationality. 
The notion of a 'natural right,' a right that is ours simply by the nature of 
things, independent of any other reason or moral duty or ideal, first appears 
in the work of William of Occam (1290-1349) and Jean Gerson (1363-1429) 
in the Late Middle Ages, and only becomes prominent in the Enlightenment 
of the seventeenth century with the work of Thomas Hobbes (1588~ 1679) and 
John Locke (1632-1704).8 For the Enlightenment thinkers, persons possess 
natural rights in a state of nature apart from government, which is itself 
legitimized by its ability to protect these rights. 
For Locke humans possess rights by nature (viz., life, liberty and property) 
which society must recognize if it is to be legitimate. They are bestowed on 
us by God. Because these rights are a gift of God, they are 'inalienable' and 
'imprescribable,' that is, we do not give them to people nor can we take them 
away nor even give our own rights away (e.g., we cannot give away our right 
to freedom by selling ourselves into slavery). They are based on our being 
created in the image of God and become the proper basis of all specific rights 
such as the right to vote, to be protected by the Law, to sell property, to work 
and to be educated. 
Locke's contemporary, Thomas Hobbes, is the first philosopher to discuss human 
rights from a secular perspective based on the idea of relative equal power. 
Nature has made men so equal in the faculties of the body and mind as that, 
though there be found one man sometimes manifestly stronger in body or of 
quicker mind than another, yet when all is reckoned together, the difference 
between man and man is not so considerable as that one man can thereupon 
claim to himself any benefit to which another may not pretend as well as he. 
For as to the strength of body, the weakest has strength enough to kill the 
strongest, either by secret machination or by confederacy with others that are 
in the same danger with himself.9 
In other words, equality is founded on the power to harm, not on a notion of 
intrinsic value. In fact, Hobbes completely rejects the notion of intrinsic 
human value. All value is instrumental. "The value or worth of a man is, as 
of all other things, his price-that is to say, so much as would be given for 
the use of his power-and therefore is not absolute but a thing dependent on 
the need and judgment of another." 
II. Kant s Theory of Absolute and Equal Worth 
The secular version of the doctrine of equal human dignity receives its first 
comprehensive form in the work of Immanuel Kant. In his Foundations of 
the Metaphysics of Morals (1785) and other writings, Kant detaches morality 
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and the notion of equal human worth from a theological perspective. Human 
beings qua rational have an inherent dignity and so ought to treat each other 
as ends and never merely as means. 
But suppose that there were something the existence of which in itself had 
absolute worth, something which, as an end in itself, could be a ground of 
definite laws. In it and only in it could lie the ground of a possible categorical 
imperative, i.e., of a practical law. Now I say, man, and in general, every 
rational being exists as an end in himself and not merely as a means to be 
arbitrarily used by this or that will ... 
Act so that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in that of 
another, always as an end and never as a means only. Human beings qua 
rational have an inherent dignity and so ought to treat each other as ends and 
never merely as means. 10 
Kant's argument for the absolute value of rational beings is difficult to deci-
pher, and some commentators like Robert Paul Wolff, having despaired of 
finding a clear argument in Kant, assert that Kant simply assumes the doc-
trine. 11 However, two non-religious arguments appear in the Foundations of 
the Metaphysics of Mora/s. (1) First there is the argument based on respect 
for reason. Kant locates the intrinsic value of humans in our ability to reason. 
What separates him from Aristotle is that practical rather than theoretical 
reason makes human life valuable. "Reason is given to us as a practical 
faculty, i.e., one which is meant to have an influence on the will. As nature 
has elsewhere distributed capacities suitable to the functions they are to 
perform, reason's proper function must be to produce a will good in itself 
and not one good merely as a means, for to the former reason is absolutely 
essential" (p. 12). It is the good will, the will to do one's duty for duty's sake, 
that is intrinsically good, the only thing that can be called "good without 
qualification" (p. 9). This good will is "within the reach of everyone, even 
the most ordinary man" (p. 20). This capacity for a good will makes us all 
equal. We ought to respect every person equally because each person is a 
rational being capable of having a good will. 
This argument has problems. First, if our ability to will the good is what 
gives us value, then it would seem that some people are more valuable than 
others because they have greater ability to will the good than others. Some 
people must struggle against great odds to will the good, others find it relatively 
easy, and still others will not only to do their duty but to do altruistic or super-
erogatory acts. So we are not of equal worth but of radically differential worth. 
Shouldn't we be treated in proportion to our ability to wiII the good? 
Secondly, Kant's equation of practical reason with the function to produce 
a good will is based on a teleological conception of human nature. Living in 
a pre-Darwinian, Christianized culture, Kant naturally saw things in terms of 
natural ends. But this aspect vitiates the secular element of his thesis. Post-
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Darwinian secular interpretations of evolution allow no place for teleological 
theories of human faculties. So we cannot speak of reason's natural function 
as producing a good will. Hence the analogy with natural law fails to produce 
an argument for the naturalness of the moral law. As there are no purposes 
in nature, there are no purposes in the function of reason. Reason is left 
without a definite purpose. 
If reason's function is not to produce a good wiJI, as Kant thought, his 
whole scheme is left in chaos. No natural order guarantees intrinsic worth to 
each person on the basis of his or her equal ability to use reason to produce 
a good will. 
Thirdly, even if we conceded that everyone was equally capable of a good 
wiJI, we would still question whether this was sufficient for equal human 
worth. Why should conscientiousness alone constitute our value? On what 
basis does Kant make one's ability to have a sense of duty the necessary and 
sufficient condition for value? Aren't theoretical reason, prudence, and the 
other moral virtues also contributory to human worth? If we built an autom-
aton which could always "will" to live by the categorical imperative, would 
that grant it equal intrinsic worth with self-conscious beings? 
In response to these objections, Kant and many other philosophers interpret 
the intrinsic value of rationality as a threshoLd trait, unlike other abilities or 
talents. Simply having the capability to reason gives one an inherent dignity. 
But this needs an argument for support and cannot be taken as a first principle. 
Even if there is a qualitative gap between beings who reason and those who 
don't, it does not follow that all who have the ability to reason are to be 
accorded equal consideration or equal rights. If reason is really all that makes 
us valuable, then the more of it the better, and those who have the most of it 
must be the most valuable in the relevant sense. 
The general strategy of my criticism is by now clear: Given any value-en-
dowing property P that persons have, it makes sense to ask whether having 
more of that property would be even better for one. If P constitutes human 
worth, then it would seem that the more of P that a person has, the better he 
or she is. The valuable trait is transferred to the person in a way that endows 
him or her with value to the exact proportion of the quantity of the trait. The 
argument can be formalized in this way: 
1) All things considered, the more one has of an intrinsically good thing 
which constitutes our essential worth, the better one is. 
2) Property P (e.g., rationality, freedom, wisdom) is intrinsically good and 
constitutes our essential worth. 
3) Therefore, all things considered, those who have more P (rationality, free-
dom, wisdom) than others, are better than those who have less of P. 
The notion of worth here is a metaphysical one such as Plato, Aristotle, Kant, 
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or G. E. Moore would have used. It is not to be equated with moral worth 
but with being morally considerable, worthy of respect. 
The ceteris paribus clause is meant to cover the fact that it might be argued 
that premise 1) is not always true. This seems correct when the good in 
question crowds out another good or when it is used for an evil purpose, but 
failing to do that, 1) seems to be true. If 1) is true and if there are intrinsically 
good properties, then the threshold argument fails and the idea of differential 
worth succeeds. 
2) Kant's second argument is based on the notion of autonomy and on the 
agent theory of free will which grounds autonomy. "What else can freedom 
of will be but autonomy-that is, the property which will has of being a law 
unto itself? .. Thus a free will and a will under the moral law are one in the 
same." Kant appeals to the notion of contra-causal freedom rooted in the 
noumenal self to provide space for a notion of equal human worth. However, 
three problems plague it. First of all, we're not supposed to have knowledge 
of the noumenal self. 12 So the idea of free will seems to lack the substance 
to ground his theory of value. Secondly, even if we have supersensible free 
wills, how does Kant know that we all have such wills to equal degrees? 
Thirdly, a Kantian libertarian interpretation of free will loses much of its 
plausibility when linked with contemporary materialist and secular views of 
human nature. Kant's views seem to depend on a kind of mind-body dualism 
repugnant to many secular philosophers. Of course, there are exceptions 
(Ducasse and Broad are two recent examples of non-religious dualists), but 
secularism seems increasingly wedded to physicalism in a way that makes the 
notion of a noumenal self, and hence a libertarian view of freedom, implausible. 
If we set Kant's notion of equal human value in the context of an anthro-
pology which holds to a noumenal and transcendental self, which is created 
by God and will survive death in an afterlife where the self will continue to 
perfect itself, then what started out as an autonomous, secular ethic has been 
transformed into a theologically based ethic. 
III. Contemporary Secular Arguments for Equal Human Worth 
Kant seems to be the source of the secular notion of the equal and absolute 
worth of rational beings, as well as the inspiration in leading philosophers 
from the classical view of inequality to a secular view of equal human worth. 
Contemporary moral philosophers usually do not follow Kant in making 
reason the sale deposit of our value, nor in using transcendental arguments, 
but they do follow him in holding to a secular doctrine of equal human worth. 
They employ such metaphysically mild strategies as the equal consideration 
strategy, existential commitment, pragmatic considerations, the notion of ra-
tional agency, and the idea of moral personality. I will first note three strat-
egies which do not include developed arguments and then turn to an 
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examination of three egalitarian arguments which seem more promising. I 
will argue that none of the arguments succeeds and that secular philosophy 
has yet to produce a plausible theory of equal rights based on equal human 
worth. 
Sometimes, no argument at all is given for the claim of equal human worth 
and the equal human rights that flow from it. Ronald Dworkin begins his 
book Taking Rights Seriously with a rejection of metaphysical assumptions. 
Individual rights are political trumps held by individuals. Individuals have 
rights when, for some reason, a collective goal is not a sufficient justification 
for denying them what they wish, as individuals, to have or to do, or not a 
sufficient justification for imposing some loss or injury upon them. That 
characterization of a right is, of course, formal in the sense that it does not 
indicate what rights people have or guarantee, indeed, that they have any. 
But it does not suppose that rights have some special metaphysical character, 
and the theory defended in these essays therefore departs from older theories 
of rights that do rely on that supposition (p. xi, italics mine). 
Nowhere in his book does Dworkin parse out the notion of "some reason" to 
override "collective goals." The notion of equal natural rights based on equal 
human worth simply becomes the assumption that replaces earlier religious 
or Kantian assumptions. "The Deepest Moral Assumption: the assumption of 
a natural right of all men and women to an equality of concern and respect, 
a right they possess not in virtue of birth or characteristic or merit or excel-
lence but simply as human beings with the capacity to make plans and give 
justice. "13 In other words, we don't need to argue for this thesis. 
Dworkin's view seems similar to what Alvin Plantinga calls "a properly 
basic belief," a foundational belief which doesn't need any further justifica-
tion. But whatever merit this strategy has for religious beliefs, it seems 
unsatisfactory when employed to justify moral and political equality. At the 
very least, we should want to know why the capacity to "make plans and give 
justice" grants all and only humans equal concern and respect. 
Closely related to Dworkin's view is the view that equal human worth is 
something we simply, arbitrarily choose. Kai Nielsen treats his allegiance to 
"Radical Egalitarianism" as an existential commitment. 
I do not know how anyone could show this belief to be true-to say nothing 
of showing it to be self-evident-or in any way prove it or show that if one 
is through and through rational, one must accept it .... A Nietzschean, a 
Benthamite, or even a classist amoralist who rejects it cannot thereby be 
shown to be irrational or even in any way necessarily to be diminished in his 
reason. It is a moral belief that I am committed to ... [and which leads] to 
some ... form of radical egalitarianism. 14 
In other words, equal human worth is a posit of secular faith, but a faith that 
seems to suffer from counter-examples: the apparent inequalities of abilities 
of every sort. 
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Similarly, Joel Feinberg concedes that the notion of human worth is "not 
demonstrably justifiable." His support for the principle of equal human worth seems 
based on a combination of existential commitment and pragmatic concerns. 
"Human worth" itself is best understood to name no property in the way that 
"strength" names strength and "redness" names redness. In attributing human 
worth to everyone we may be ascribing no property or set of qualities, but 
rather expressing an attitude-the attitude of respect-towards the humanity 
in each man's person. That attitude follows naturally from regarding everyone 
from the 'human point of view', but it is not grounded on anything more 
ultimate than itself, and it is not demonstrably justifiable. 
It can be argued further against the skeptics that a world with equal human 
rights is a more just world, a way of organizing society for which we would 
all opt if we were designing our institutions afresh in ignorance of the roles 
we might one day have to play in them. It is also a less dangerous world 
generally, and one with a more elevated and civilized tone. If none of this 
convinces the skeptic, we should turn our backs on him to examine more 
important problems. 15 
Feinberg may be correct in seeking to disentangle the concept of human worth 
from a property-view, but his own position seems to have its own problems. 
He needs to tell us why we should take the attitude of regarding everyone 
as equally worthy. What is this peculiar "human point of view" which sup-
posedly grounds the notion of equal human worth? His pragmatic justification 
(i.e., that it will result in a less dangerous, more elevated and civilized world) 
simply needs to be argued out, for it's not obvious that acting as if everyone 
were of equal worth would result in a less dangerous world than one in which 
we treated people according to some other criteria. 
Feinberg's claim that a world with equal human rights based on equal worth 
"is a more just world" is simply question-begging, since it is exactly the 
notion of equal worth that is contested in the idea of justice. Formally, we 
are to treat equals equally and unequals unequally. Feinberg seems to be 
saying that justice consists in treating all people as though they were equal 
whether or not they are. 
But ignoring this and supposing that there were good utilitarian reasons to 
treat people as though they were of equal worth, we would still want to know 
whether we really were of equal worth. If the evidence is not forthcoming, 
then the thesis of equal worth would have all the ear-marks of Plato's Noble 
Lie, ironically, asserting the very contrary of the original. Whereas for Plato 
the Noble Lie consisted in teaching people that they are really unequal in 
order to bring about social stability, for Feinberg it consists in teaching people 
that they are all equal in order to bring social stability to a democratic society. 
Feinberg's final comment, "If none of this convinces the skeptic, we should 
turn our backs on him to examine more important problems," signals a flight 
from the battle, an admission that the Emperor has no clothes, for what could 
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be more important than justifying these fundamental ideas in socio-political 
philosophy?16 
Accepting equal human worth as a fundamental assumption, an existential 
posit or as a useful attitude, lacks an adequate persuasive component. These 
strategies may be suggestive of a valid interpretation, but in themselves they 
do not get us very far towards justifying egalitarianism. There are three more 
sustained strategies in the literature, however, and to these we now tum. 
The first, and most popular, of these more developed strategies is the 
Presumption of Equality Argument. Isaiah Berlin, R. S. Peters, Stanley Benn, 
Monroe Beardsley, E. F. Carritt and others interpret equal worth in terms of 
equal consideration and argue that there is a presumption in favor of treating 
people equally. "All persons are to be treated alike, unless there are good reasons 
for treating them differently. "17 Isaiah Berlin expresses the view this way: 
The assumption is that equality needs no reasons, only inequality does so; 
that uniformity, regularity, similarity, symmetry ... need not be specially ac-
counted for, whereas differences, unsystematic behavior, change in conduct, 
need explanation and, as a rule, justification. If I have a cake and there are 
ten persons among whom I wish to divide it, then if I give exactly one tenth 
to each, this will not. .. call for justification; whereas if I depart from this 
principle of equal division I am expected to produce a special reason. IS 
This type of egalitarianism seems unduly formal. One might as well say that 
"all sentient beings should be treated alike, unless there are good reasons for 
treating them differently." The formula only shifts the focus onto good rea-
sons. We need to know by virtue of what material criterion people are to be 
treated equally or differently. Aristotle's aristocratic views could accommo-
date this form notion of equal worth: Treat slaves differently from philoso-
phers, for they have different levels of rational ability. Inegalitarians simply 
claim that there is a good reason for unequal treatment of human beings. They 
are of unequal worth. 
The presumption of equality argument reduces to the notion of impartiality 
(what R. M. Hare calls "universalizability") and is not really an egalitarian 
argument at all. It prescribes that we not act arbitrarily, but consistently. We 
should make our discriminations according to a proper standard. But doing 
so does not commit us to egalitarianism. 
Recurring to Berlin's cake, I might well divide the cake in nine unequal 
pieces and offer it to nine children on the basis of their need or desert, while 
I withhold it from one because he is overweight. 
Sometimes, egalitarians modify the presumption of equality argument to 
read "everyone's interests should be given equal consideration." Interests 
are made the material criterion. But I don't think that this modification helps 
matters, for interests is a goal-oriented relational term. The formula is gen-
erally: Something (it need not be an agent but may be a tree or a work of art) 
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has an interest I in order to achieve some goal G. For example, the patient 
has an interest in medicine in order to regain her health. It is in the interest 
of the New York Yankees to acquire a good left handed relief pitcher in order 
to save close baseball games. But if interests are relative to goals, we need 
to assess the worthwhileness of those goals. If it turns out that the goals of 
an Aristotle are more worthy than the goals of a human with less intellectual 
abilities, then the formula of equal consideration of interests is compatible 
with inegaIitarianism. It is still essentially a formal principle which enjoins 
impartiality but not substantive equality. 
One must question the very form of the presumption argument. There seems 
something arbitrary about placing a presumption in favor of equality rather 
than inequality. Why don't we have a principle presuming unequal treatment: 
"AIl persons are to be treated unequaIly unless there is some reason for 
treating them equaIly"? Is it sheer pragmatism or utilitarian considerations 
that cause Benn and Peters to opt for a presumption of equality rather than 
inequality? 
One of the most intriguing arguments for equal rights based on equal worth 
is that based on the notion of rational agency, as set forth by Thomas Nagel, 
Peter Singer, and Alan Gewirth. 19 Since I find Nagel's version clearer and 
superior, I wiII concentrate on it. 
In several places Nagel has argued that from the impersonal point of view, 
"a view from nowhere," all humans have equal and positive value. Pleasure 
and happiness are positive values and the capacity to suffer a negative one. 
We, as containers of these properties, have value by virtue of the very pos-
session of them. 
You cannot sustain an impersonal indifference to the things in your life which 
matter to you personally: some of the most important have to be regarded as 
mattering, period, so that others besides yourself have reason to take them 
into account. But since the impersonal standpoint does not single you out 
from anyone else, the same must be true of the values arising in other lives. 
If you matter impersonally, so does everyone .... From the impersonal stand-
point.. . everyone's life matters, and no one is more important than anyone 
else. This does not mean that some people may not be more important in 
virtue of their greater value for others. But at the baseline of value in the 
lives of individuals, from which all higher order inequalities of value must 
derive, everyone counts the same. For a given quantity of whatever it is that's 
good or bad-suffering or happiness or fulfilment or frustration-its intrinsic 
impersonal value doesn't depend on whose it is.2o 
Singer and Gewirth's versions are similar in that all three involve the univer-
salization of the agent's valuing of himself or of his own projects or capacity 
for values. The argument seems to go like this: 
1. I cannot help but value myself as a subject of positive and negative 
experiences (e.g., suffering, happiness, fulfillment or frustration). 
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2. All other humans are relevantly similar to me, subjects of positive and 
negative experiences. 
3. Therefore, I must, on pain of contradiction, ascribe equal value to all other 
humans. 
491 
Although this argument has enormous popular appeal, I think it is defective, 
beginning with the first premise. First of all, I don't value myself simply as the 
possessor of the capacity for positive and negative experiences. I value myself 
because of a complex of specific properties, the kind of qualities that Dworkin, 
Tom Regan and others insist are irrelevant to value: excellence, moral virtue, 
discipline, rationality, artistic prowess, good health and athletic ability. I value 
myself more for actually having these properties than I do, or at least in a different 
way than I do, my capacity to suffer. These are what positively make up my 
happiness. If I were to lose anyone of these properties, I, given my present 
identity, would value myself less than I do now. Should I lose enough of them, 
my present self would view this future self as lacking positive value altogether, 
and my future self might well agree. Should I become immoral, insane, or 
desperately disease ridden, I would be valueless and I hope I would die as swiftly 
as possible. So it would follow that I am under no obligation to value everyone, 
since not everyone is moral, rational or healthy. There is no contradiction in 
failing to value Rawls' blade of grass counter, the rapist, the child molester, the 
severely retarded child, or the senile, since they lack the necessary qualities. And 
I may value others to the degree that they exhibit the appropriate qualities. 
So we need to revise the first premise to read: 
lAo I cannot help but value myself as the possessor of a set of traits T. 
But then 2 does not follow. All other humans are not relevantly similar to me 
in this regard. I need only value those who are like me in the relevant respects. 
In fact, people seem to value themselves for many different reasons de-
pending on heredity, upbringing, experience, or whatever. Bentham seemed 
to think that it was our common ability to suffer that gave us and animals 
equal worth, and Peter Singer and Tom Regan, following Bentham, argue that 
if we only had enough painkiller to alleviate either the pain of a normal human 
or the pain of an animal, we would have to make the decision on the basis 
of who was suffering most. 21 Albert Schweitzer, who believed that life itself 
gives every living thing equal worth, suffered remorse in applying germ-
killing antibiotics to suffering humans. 
But these least-common-denominator properties seem too general to define 
whatever intrinsic worth we may have, or to generate a sense of universal 
equal respect and concern. However, any more specific properties, such as 
feeling pleasure or being rational, moral, courageous or healthy, lead to un-
equal worth. Indeed, there is even a problem of specifying which properties 
should be taken into account in granting sentient beings value. 
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What the egalitarian really wants is a non-metaphysical proposition equiv-
alent to the theological doctrine that all humans have been created equal in 
the image of God and have immortal souls of inestimable worth. But once 
the metaphysical foundations for equal worth are destroyed, it's very difficult 
to construct that thesis on the shifting sands of empirical human traits. 
There is a second problem with Nagel's argument. It rests too heavily on 
the agent's judgment about himself. "If you matter impersonally, so does 
everyone." There are two ways to invalidate this conditional. The conditional 
won't go through if you don't value yourself. If I am sick of life and believe 
that I don't matter, then, on Nagel's premises, I have no reason to value 
anyone else. Secondly, I may deny the consequent and thereby reject the 
antecedent. I may come to believe that no one else does matter and then be 
forced to acknowledge that I don't matter either. We're all equal-equally 
worthless. 
Thirdly, note the consequentialist tone of the last two sentences of Nagel's 
statement: " ... at the baseline of value in the lives of individuals, from which 
all higher order inequalities of value must derive, everyone counts the same. 
For a given quantity of whatever it is that's good or bad-suffering or hap-
piness or fulfillment or frustration-its intrinsic impersonal value doesn't 
depend on whose it is." We hear the echo of Bentham's "each one to count 
for one and no one for more than one" in this passage. But Nagel and Bentham 
before him cannot be both maximizer and egalitarian. If it is the suffering or 
happiness that really is the good to be maximized, then individuals are mere 
place holders for these qualities, so that if we can maximize happiness by 
subordinating some individuals to others, we should do so. 
If it is the properties of happiness or pleasure or non-suffering that are 
important, then it doesn't really matter who has them, so long as they are 
had. If A can derive 10 hedons by eliminating Band C who together can only 
obtain 8 hedons, it would be a good thing for A to kill Band C. If it turns 
out that a pig satisfied really is happier than Socrates dissatisfied, then we 
ought to value the pig's life more than Socrates, and if a lot of people are 
miserable and are making others miserable, we would improve the total 
happiness of the world by killing them. 
No exposition of egalitarianism has had a greater influence on our gener-
ation than John Rawls' A Theory of Justice, which Robert Nisbet has called 
"the long awaited successor to Rousseau's Social Contract. .. the Rock on 
which the Church of Equality can properly be founded in our time. "22 Rawls 
sets forth a hypothetical contract theory in which the bargainers go behind a 
veil of ignorance in order to devise a set of fundamental agreements that are 
fair. 
First of all no one knows his place in society, his class position or social 
status; nor does he know his fortune in the distribution of natural assets and 
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abilities, his intelligence and the like. Nor, again, does anyone know his 
conception of the good, the particulars of his rational plan of life, or even 
the special features of his psychology such as his aversion to risk or liability 
to optimism or pessimism. More than this, I assume that the parties do not 
know the particular circumstances of their own society. That is, they do not 
know its economic or political situation, or the level of civilization and 
culture it has been able to achieve. The persons in the original position have 
no information as to which generation they belong (p. 137). 
493 
By denying individuals knowledge of their natural assets and social position 
Rawls prevents them from exploiting their advantages, thus transforming a 
decision under risk (where probabilities of outcomes are known) to a decision 
under uncertainty (where probabilities are not known). To the question, why 
should the individual acknowledge the principles chosen as morally binding? 
Rawls would answer, "We should abide by these principles because we all 
chose them under fair conditions." That is, the rules and rights chosen by fair 
procedures are themselves fair, since these procedures take full account of 
our moral nature as equally capable of "doing justice." The two principles 
that would be chosen, Rawls argues, are (1) everyone will have an equal right 
to equal basic liberties and (2) social and economic inequalities must satisfy 
two conditions: (a) they are to attach to positions open to all under conditions 
of fair equality of opportunity; and (b) they must serve the greatest advantage 
of the least advantaged members of society (the difference principle). 
Michael Sandel has criticized Rawls' project as lacking a notion of intrinsic 
worth. "Rawls' principles do not mention moral desert because, strictly speak-
ing, no one can be said to deserve anything .... On Rawls' view people have 
no intrinsic worth, no worth that is intrinsic in the sense that it is theirs prior 
to or independent of... what just institutions attribute to them. "23 
Although Rawls sometimes lays himself open to this kind of charge, I think 
that Sandel is wrong here. What grounds Rawls' social contract is a Kantian 
humanism. 
Each person possesses an inviolability founded on justice that even the wel-
fare of society as a whole cannot override. For this reason justice denies that 
the loss of freedom for some is made right by a greater good shared by others. 
It does not allow that the sacrifices imposed on a few are outweighed by the 
larger sum of advantages enjoyed by the many. Therefore, in a just society 
the liberties of equal citizenship are taken as settled; the rights secured by 
justice are not subject to political bargaining or the calculus of social interests 
(p. 3f). 
At the center of Rawls' project is a respect for the individual as "inviolable," 
sacred, whose essential rights are inalienable. In Section 77 of Rawls' book 
this inviolability is grounded in our having "the capacity for moral personal-
ity," that is, the ability to enter into moral deliberation. "It is precisely the 
moral persons who are entitled to equal justice. Moral persons are distin-
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guished by two features: first they are capable of having ... a conception of 
the good; and second they are capable of having ... a sense of justice .... One 
should observe that moral personality is here defined as a potentiality that is 
ordinarily realized in due course. It is this potentiality which brings the claims 
of justice into play. "24 
Members in the original position are not mere utilitarian containers of the 
good but Kantian "ends in themselves," who are worthy of "equal concern 
and respect." Rawls already presupposes equal and positive worth at the very 
beginning of his project. The question is, is this assumption reasonable? Is 
Rawls' egalitarian starting point justified? I think not. Given the framework 
in which Rawls writes there is no reason to suppose that we have intrinsic 
and equal value. Let me explain. 
A standard criticism of A Theory of Justice is that it fails to take into 
account the conservative who, as a gambler, would rather take his chances 
on a meritocratic or hierarchical society and so reject part or all of Rawls' 
second principle. I think that this objection is even stronger than has been 
made out, for it is not simply as a gambler that the conservative will self-in-
terestedly choose meritocracy, but rather because he or she deems it the 
essence of justice. 
This point becomes highlighted when we examine Rawls' threshold prin-
ciple. "Once a certain minimum is met, a person is entitled to equal liberty 
on a par with everyone else" (p. 506). This move, which we already noted in 
our discussion of Kant, seems ad hoc. There is no obvious reason why we 
should opt for tacit equal status (let alone inviolability) rather than an Aris-
totelian hierarchical structure based on differential ability to reason or deliberate. 
Even as some life plans are objectively better than others, so some people might 
well be considered more worthy than others and treated accordingly. 
Why would it be wrong to weight the votes behind the veil of ignorance 
according to criteria of assessment? For example, the deeply reflective with 
low time preferences would be given more votes than the less reflective with 
high time preferences. Those with high grades might get four or five votes 
whereas the minimally reflective might get only one vote. Why have only 
one threshold between those who pass and those who fail the rationality test, 
as Rawls proposes? Why not have five or six thresholds? 
With different layers of weighted votes one would still expect a benevolent 
society, but the difference principle might well be replaced by Harsanyi's 
average utility principle or Frankfurt's sufficiency principle, permitting hier-
archical arrangements.2~ Rawls' first principle (maximum liberty) and the first 
half of the second principle (equal opportunity) would very likely result in a 
hierarchical, elitist society. 
What would Rawls say to these criticisms? Why does he hold on to a 
principle of equal intrinsic worth? The closest Rawls comes to addressing 
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this question is when he states that self-respect is a fundamental human need 
which his theory satisfies and which hierarchical arrangements fail to sat-
isfy.26 The argument might be formalized in this way. 
1. We need self-respect in order to live meaningful lives. Self-respect gives 
us inner pride or good feelings about ourselves, which are necessary for 
placing positive value on our plans of life and motivating us to cooperative 
activity in society. 
2. Self-respect entails that our essential worth is equal to everyone else's. 
3. We have a moral community where every participant feels a stake in the 
form of life only if we can live meaningful lives. 
4. A community that lives by the principles of Justice as Fairness is a moral 
community. 
Therefore 
5. If a community is to be moral then it is the case that we are all of equal 
worth. 
Rawls seems to be using the notion of equal worth as a deus ex machina in 
order to serve his complex theory. It fits into his scheme as a coherent part, 
but it seems ad hoc, needing a clearer defense. First of all, it isn't obvious 
that the notion of equal worth is needed in order to live a meaningful life. 
Plato didn't think so. (And if Plato held an unjustified bias towards aristoc-
racy, Rawls reveals a bias towards democracy). Secondly, self-respect seems 
partly a function of our success in life. It is not clear that we can lack all 
virtues and talents and be a complete failure at what we endeavor to do and 
still maintain self-respect-except in a purely formal sense. As long as there 
are limited resources, including the resource of roles and status, some will 
succeed and others fail in realizing these goods. Thirdly, even if we needed 
the notion of self-respect to keep society happy, it might be the case that it 
was nevertheless a myth. 
Kai Nielsen has responded to these criticisms of Rawls by saying that one 
needs to take Rawls' total project into consideration together with what we 
know about human nature in order to build a coherentist justification of 
secular morality. Nielsen claims that Rawls' method of wide reflective equi-
librium, a method which aims at providing a fit between our moral theory 
and our particular moral judgments, will eventually show that the principle 
of equal human worth and the consequent prescription of equal human treat-
ment are morally justifiedY Good coherentist theories distinguish themselves 
from fairy tales and other fictions by being rooted in evidence, or at least by 
not having strong evidence oppose them, but there does seem to be strong 
evidence against egalitarianism. 
Contrary to egalitarians there is good reason to believe that humans are not 
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of equal worth. On the basis of empirical observation, it is hard to believe 
that humans are equal in any way at all. We all seem to have vastly different 
levels of abilities. Some, like Aristotle, Newton, Galileo, Shakespeare, and 
Einstein are very intelligent; others are imbeciles and idiots. Some like Soc-
rates and Abraham Lincoln are wise; others are very foolish. Some have great 
powers of foresight and are able to defer gratification, while others, hardly 
able to assess their present circumstances, gamble away their futures, suc-
cumb to immediate gratification and generally go through life as in a fog. 
Empirically, Einstein, Gandhi and Mother Teresa have more value than Jack 
the Ripper or Hitler. If a research scientist with the cure for cancer were on 
the same life raft with an ordinary person, we have no doubt about who should 
be saved on the basis of functional value. 
Take any capacity or ability you like: reason, a good will, the capacity to 
suffer, the ability to deliberate and choose freely, the ability to make moral 
decisions and carry them out, and humans (not to mention animals) differ in 
the degree to which they have those capacities and abilities. 
Furthermore, given the purely secular version of the theory of evolution, 
we have no reason to believe in the physico-teleological theory that supports 
the notion of a common human family or the idea of brotherhood as put forth 
in the United Nations' Declaration on Human Rights (quoted at the beginning 
of this paper). If we're simply a product of blind evolutionary chance and 
necessity, it is hard to see where the family connection comes in. Who is the 
parent? In fact, on the basis of a naturalistic account of the origins of homo 
sapiens, it is hard to see that humans have intrinsic value at all. If we are 
simply physicalist constructions, where does intrinsic value emerge? 
IV. Human Dignity: Our Judeo-Christian 
Tradition and our Common Ancestry 
The proposition that all people are of equal worth, and thus endowed with 
inalienable rights, is rooted in our religious heritage. The language of human 
dignity and worth implies a great family in which a benevolent and sovereign 
Father binds together all his children in love and justice. The originators of 
rights language presupposed a theistic world view, and secular advocates of 
equal rights are like children who see beautiful flowers, grab them, break 
them at their stems, and try to transplant them without their roots. The egal-
itarian assertions of the United Nations' Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights are similar to those of our Declaration of Independence with one 
important difference-God is left out of the former-but that makes all the 
difference. That posit (or something equivalent) is not just an ugly appendage 
but a root necessary for the bloom of rights. 
While the thesis of equal human worth may not have been clearly recog-
nized, let alone embraced, by ancient Israel or in all Jewish and Christian 
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quarters, the Jewish prophetic tradition and much of the Christian tradition, 
finds the thesis in the Scriptures: in such texts as Genesis chapters 1 to 3, 
which speak of God creating man and woman in His image and as valuable-
"good"; in Malachi 2: 10, where the prophet writes, "Have we not all one 
Father? Has not one God created us? Why then are we faithless to one 
another?" and in Ps. 8:3-6, where the Psalmist asks, "When I look at thy 
heavens, the work of thy fingers, the moon and the stars which thou hast 
established; What is man that thou art mindful of him, or the son of man that 
thou dost care for him?" and answers his own question, "Thou hast made him 
little less than God, and dost crown him with glory and honor. Thou hast 
given him dominion over the works of thy hands; thou hast put all things 
under his feet." The prophets Amos, Micah, and Isaiah, speak of God's con-
cern being universal. They speak of a coming universal kingdom wherein all 
people enjoy peace and prosperity. 28 
In the New Testament and in the early Christian church there are strains 
which point to the thesis that all humans are loved equally by God and are 
equally accountable to him for their actions. The moral law is revealed to 
each person, so that each will be judged by his or her moral desert. Still, even 
the sinner is of incalculable worth; like a corroded and distorted coin of the 
royal mint, he or she still bears the King's image. 
Of course, in itself theism is no guarantee of equal worth, for God could 
have created people unequal. The argument implicit in the Judeo-Christian 
tradition seems to be that God is the ultimate value and that humans derive 
their value by being created in his image and likeness. To paraphrase the 
Psalmist, we are a little lower than God, mini-gods, as it were. With regard 
to possessing intrinsic value we all get equal grades. 
There are two arguments for equal human worth which I find implicit in 
the Judeo-Christian tradition: the Essentialist Argument and the Argument 
from Grace. 
The Essentialist Argument goes like this: God created all humans with an 
equal amount of some property P, which constitutes value. The property may 
be a natural or a non-natural one. If it is a natural one, then conceivably we 
could discover it and act upon it without needing God (though we might still 
need the incentive of divine grace or sanctions to respond appropriately to 
this value). The property could be simple or complex, and we might not easily 
identify it. 
If it is a non-natural property, the only reason to suppose that we possess 
it is that our theory says we do. The fact that we cannot identify it constitutes 
some evidence against the theory itself, but if there are good reasons to accept 
the theory as a whole, one might be content to live with mystery. 
Human rights fit into this scheme as the sort of dignity-recognition claims 
that creatures of divine value are entitled to make against one another. 
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The second argument which I find in the Judeo-Christian tradition is the 
Argument from Grace. Strictly speaking it is not an egalitarian argument, if 
egalitarianism means that each person has equal intrinsic worth. Here the actual 
value may be different in different people but grace levels or compensates the 
differences. It raises the least best off until they are equal with the best off. 
The Argument from Grace often makes use of the family metaphor. God is 
our Heavenly Father, and we are all family, brothers and sisters of each other. 
As our Father, God loves us each equally and unconditionally, and wants his 
or her children to love each other. All humans are his children and as such 
we should be concerned about their welfare. 
One illustration of this argument occurs in the Sermon on the Mount re-
corded in the Gospel of st. Matthew, chapter 5, beginning at verse 43. Jesus 
shows how the Old Testament already commits one to universal love, love 
of one's enemies as well as one's friends. "Ye have heard that it hath been 
said, Thou shalt love thy neighbor, and hate thine enemy," he says, echoing 
the usual interpretation of the Torah (Lev. 19:18 and Deut. 23:6), a common 
sense morality that is found throughout the world. Then Jesus seeks to trans-
form their moral sense by showing his disciples that they ought to love their 
enemies also. "But I say unto you, Love your enemies, bless them that curse 
you, do good to them that hate you, and pray for them which despitefully use 
you, and persecute you; That ye may be the children of your Father which is 
in heaven: for he maketh his sun to rise on the evil and on the good, and 
sendeth rain on the just and on the unjust. For if you love them which love 
you, what reward have ye? Do not even the pUblicans the same? .. Be ye 
therefore perfect, even as your Father which is in heaven is perfect." 
The argument goes like this: 
1. God is perfect (Matt. 5:47). 
2. Everyone who is morally perfect loves his children, brethren and friends. 
3. The evil and the good are God's children (Mal. 2:10). 
4. You and your enemies are God's children (implication of 3). 
5. Therefore God loves both you and your enemies (1, 2, and 4). 
6. Your enemies are your brethren (from 4). 
7. Therefore, if you would be an obedient child (i.e., perfect) of your Father, 
you ought to love your enemies as well as your friends (2 and 6). 
Jesus pointed out that the whole of the Torah can be summed up in two Great 
Commandments found in the Torah: "Thou shalt love the Lord, Thy God, 
with all thy heart, and with all thy soul and with all thy mind" and "Thou 
shalt love thy neighbor as thyself' (Matt. 22:37f; Deut. 6:5; Lev. 19:18). As 
Jesus further points out in the Parable of the Good Samaritan, every human 
A CRITIQUE OF CONTEMPORARY EGALITARIANISM 499 
has the capacity for becoming my neighbor. Whoever is in need and can be 
helped by my effort is my neighbor. 
God commands us to love each other as members of a single family or 
neighbors, which translates into prima facie duties of meeting basic needs 
(including the need for life itself and freedom). From the duty to God to serve 
our fellows, our fellows derive a prima facie right to have their basic needs met. 
If God commands A to treat B as a free agent, then B receives a right to freedom 
against A. All human rights are derived from God's loving commands. 
The Argument from Grace is a version of the divine command theory, 
though it does not entail reducing all morality to divine commands. Some 
moral duties may be based on human nature, while the duty to equal regard 
for the welfare of all persons may be a product of God's command. That is, 
morality may be a combination of divine commands and rational discoveries. 
The two arguments can stand separately or together in making the case for 
the thesis of equal human rights based on equal worth. That is, it is the 
God-relationship that provides the metaphysical basis for this thesis, whether 
the equality comes in at creation or whether it is due to grace. 
One suspects that the real motivation behind Kant's view of humanity's 
having equal and intrinsic worth is his own religious heritage, which is always 
lurking in the background. In the Critique of Judgment he reveals his theo-
logical-teleological assumptions. "Man is the final end of creation. Without 
man the chain of mutually subordinated ends would have no ultimate point of 
attachment."29 As Keith Ward and others have persuasively argued, without this 
religious teleological metaphysic, Kant's moral theory makes little sense.30 
As Alan Donagan explains, this fundamental principle of the Hebraic-
Christian tradition, most explicitly articulated by Aquinas and Kant, has far-
reaching implications. It means respecting every human life, no matter how 
retarded or vicious or perverted, as an inviolable fundamental good. This 
sacred regard prohibits exploitation, such as slavery, manipulation, and per-
haps even violence in self-defense (Matt. 5:39). Equal concern for each 
other's needs transcends utilitarian considerations. 31 
Of course, I do not mean to say that the Judeo-Christian tradition is the 
only logical basis for a doctrine of positive equal worth. I am simply saying 
that this has been our historic basis. One could opt for a Stoic pantheism 
which maintains that all humans have within them a part of God, the logos 
spermatikos. We are all part of God, chips off the old divine block as it were. 
We could even choose forms of dualism or polytheism, arguing that different 
gods created different races in their own images. The races evolved at differ-
ent paces from different sources, being guided by the invisible hand of a rival 
god, but since the gods are essentially equal and have the power to endow 
their creation with that quality, each human being is equal-though unrelated. 
Here equal worth exists without the universal family metaphor. 
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The possibilities are frighteningly innumerable. My point is that you need 
some metaphysical explanation to ground the doctrine of equal worth. It is 
not enough simply to assert, as philosophers like Dworkin do, that their 
doctrines of human rights and equal human worth are "metaphysically unam-
bitious." In this area metaphysics is the Capital on which human rights de-
pends as interest. 
Objections 
Finally, I must address two important objections to my thesis that the basis 
for the doctrine of equal human worth is located in the Jewish-Christian 
version of theism. 32 
Objection 1: If the empirical facts belie the secular theory of equal worth, 
why don't they equally challenge the religious version of this theory? 
Response: Both religious and secular egalitarians must deal with recalci-
trant empirical data, the unequal rationality, wisdom, morality, ability and 
talents of humans. My argument has been that secular theories have failed to 
provide a metaphysically rich explanation to justify the notion of equal worth 
in spite of the evidence, whereas religious theories have. The burden of my 
criticism has been levelled at the very eschewal of metaphysics which the 
secular theories embrace. The theist acknowledges the empirical data but 
reinterprets it in the light of his or her theology. To a considerable degree the 
thesis of equal human worth must be acknowledged as a mystery of faith. 
Objection 2: You dismiss the possibility that an equal worth doctrine might 
be a foundational assumption in someone's ethics. You urge the secular egal-
itarians to find better arguments for their position or give up the doctrine of 
equal worth. But if we have to assume a questionable religious metaphysic 
in order to justify the equal worth doctrine, why not simply assume equal 
worth in the first place? 
Response: Accepting egalitarianism as foundational, that is, without sup-
porting evidence, has, to quote Bertrand Russell, "all the virtues of theft 
over honest toil." It has all the problems of intuitionism-there is no basis 
for discussion or argument with people who don't share the intuitions. Even 
religious foundationalists, who see belief in God as properly basic, admit 
that it is preferable to have arguments for properly basic beliefs. If we're 
reduced to merely pleading that egalitarianism is innocent until proven 
guilty, the doctrine has lost much of its force. It is reduced to a matter of 
private secular-religion, an existential leap, but not a rationally derived 
doctrine. 
As far as religion goes, its case may be weak, though not as weak as some 
might think. If it turns out that it is irrational to believe in an equality-be-
stowing-Creator, then the correct move would be to give up the belief in equal 
human worth to ground human rights. 
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Conclusion 
It is a puzzling irony that during most of the time that egalitarian Judeo-
Christian metaphysics flourished, so did gross inequalities: slavery, classism, 
anti-democratic elitism, sexual and racial discrimination, and ethnocentric-
ism; whereas during our age when the leading metaphysic is value-less or 
value neutral (all life plans are equally valid-at least as long as they tolerate 
or respect others), equality is busting out all over. Elitism is the unpardonable 
sin of our day in a culture that has bought Rawls' difference (maximim) 
principle. Discrimination is condemned on every front-unless it is reverse 
discrimination. It's as if our culture has finally realized the attractiveness of 
the egalitarian edifice just when its capital has run out and now is building 
on the remaining interest from a bank account that has been closed. The idea 
is in danger of bankruptcy. 
I have argued that at best, secular egalitarians have made it a posit of faith 
that all humans are of equal worth. They have not offered plausible reasons 
for their thesis, and, given empirical considerations, inegalitarianism seems 
plausible. I have suggested that we are living off the borrowed interest of a 
religious metaphysic, for the notion of equal worth finds its natural setting 
in a theistic world view, which even the principal founder of the notion of 
equal human worth supposed. I have not argued that theism is true, but since 
it is such a fitting premise for egalitarian arguments, egalitarians should at 
least give it serious consideration. Failing that, they should either find inde-
pendent arguments for the notion of equal human rights or join Arthur Danto 
in frankly admitting that the claim of human rights is without foundation, 
simply a clever bluff. 33 
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